We use recently developed approaches in argumentation theory in order to revamp the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation, thus alleviating the well-known paradoxes the H-D account faces. More specifically, we introduce the concept of dialectic confirmation on the background of the so-called theory of dialectical structures [Betz, 2010 [Betz, , 2011 . Dialectic confirmation generalises hypothetico-deductive confirmation and mitigates the raven paradox, the grue paradox, the tacking paradox, the paradox from conceptual difference, and the problem of novelty.
Introduction
According to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, a scientific hypothesis is confirmed by its true deductive implications, in particular by its true empirical consequences. Thus, a successful prediction lends, for example, evidential support to the theory that entailed it. While the H-D model was spelled out and championed by logical positivists, it had figured prominently in the history of the philosophy of science before, being advocated, e.g., by scholars such as John Herschel and Stanley Jevons [c.f. Losee, 2001 ]. Yet, as we will review below, the H-D account of confirmation faces systematic objections to the effect that it is nowadays largely dismissed as indefensible. Notwithstanding this criticism, the H-D model seems to provide an adequate description of historical as well as current scientific practice, as its opponents admit [e.g. Glymour, 1980, p. 48] . Moreover, today's mainstream theory of confirmation, i.e. Bayesianism, cites in its favour its ability to give a justification of hypothetico-deductive methods [Talbott, 2008, Howson and Urbach, 1989, p. 82] .
Thus, a defence of the H-D model may still be worthwhile. This paper takes on the challenge, arguing that hypothetico-deductivism provides yet an attractive outlook on empirical confirmation. In particular, it shows how recent developments in argumentation theory can be used to refine the simple H-D model so as to avoid the diverse objections which have been put forward against it.
The overall argument this paper unfolds proceeds as follows. The view that a hypothesis is confirmed by its true deductive implications gives rise to a bunch of wellknown problems. Section 2 briefly reports these objections hypothetico-deductivism faces. The revamp of the H-D account that aims at circumventing those problems is couched within a specific argumentation-theoretic framework: The so-called theory of dialectical structures, being introduced in section 3. On the background of that framework, section 4 puts forward a dialectic notion of confirmation which modifies the simple H-D account. The concept of dialectic confirmation, we argue in section 5, allows one to solve the paradoxes outlined in section 2.
Problems of hypothetico-deductivism
Raven paradox. Consider the hypothesis H that all ravens are black and let a be an individual raven. 1 Clearly, H implies that a is black. According to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, observing that a is black therefore confirms H. Likewise, the hypothesis H that all non-black things are non-ravens is confirmed by verifying that some non-black object b is not a raven, but, e.g., a green leaf. Yet, the hypothesis H is logically equivalent with H. Given that any two logically equivalent hypotheses are supported by the very same evidence, verifying that the green object b is a leaf should also confirm H. But that, or so it seems, is not the case: H does not speak of green things at all, let alone leaves, so how could it be confirmed by observing a green leaf?
Grue paradox. As Goodman [1983, pp. 73ff.] has famously argued, the hypothesis that all emeralds are green implies exactly the same available empirical data (as of today) as the hypothesis which states that all emeralds are grue-where grue is the property of being green and being observed before some future point in time t or being blue and not being observed before t. According to the hypothetico-deductive account, both hypotheses are equally confirmed by our available evidence. Yet this is apparently not the case: We all (evidently rightly) infer, from our occasional encounters with jewellery, that emeralds are green, not grue.
Tacking paradox. Whatever is implied by some hypothesis H is also implied by the conjunction H&C, where C represents an arbitrary, possibly irrelevant or even silly, claim. Thus, whatever confirms H, confirms, according to hypotheticodeductivism, H&C as well. 2 But this is, again, an absurd consequence. The observation of interference patterns confirms, for example, the wave-theory of light, whereas it does not confirm the hypothesis conjoining the wave-theory of light and the claim that humans are descended from kangaroos.
Paradox from conceptual difference. Consider two theoretical hypotheses, H 1 and H 2 , that are empirically equivalent but conceptually distinct. Hypotheticodeductivism has it, then, that the evidential support for H 1 is the same as for H 2 . But now assume: "H 1 , but not H 2 , is derivable from a more general theory T , which also entails another hypothesis H. An empirical consequence e of H is obtained. e supports H and thereby T . Thus e provides indirect evidential warrant for H 1 , of which it is not a consequence, without affecting the credentials of H 2 ." [Laudan, 1991, p. 464] In contradiction to hypothetico-deductivism, H 1 and H 2 are not confirmed by the same items of evidence. Problem of novelty. According to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, a hypothesis is confirmed by entailed items of evidence no matter when the respective observations were made, or whether they were unexpected or not. As a result, hypothetico-deductivism collides with the highly plausible view that new and surprising predictions which turn out to be correct confirm a hypothesis H to a higher degree than old, well-known evidence which is implied by H. 3
Fundamentals of the theory of dialectical structures
A dialectical structure τ = T, A, U is a set of deductively valid arguments (premiss-conclusion structure), T , on which an attack relation, A, and a support relation, U , are defined as follows (a, b ∈ T ):
• A(a, b) : ⇐⇒ a's conclusion is contradictory to one of b's premisses;
• U (a, b) : ⇐⇒ a's conclusion is equivalent to one of b's premisses. Relative to a dialectical structure τ , which in a sense depicts the state of a debate, one can specify the positions of different proponents. We may, generally, distinguish complete and partial positions. A complete position Q (a proponent can adopt) on τ is a truth value assignment to all sentences which figure in arguments in T , i.e. Q : S → {t, f }, where S is the set of all sentences in τ . A partial position P (a proponent can adopt) on τ is a truth value assignment to some sentences which figure in arguments in T , i.e. P : S → {t, f }, where S ⊆ S. Whereas figure 1 shows two complete positions defined on a dialectical structure, figure 2 gives an example for a partial position defined on the very same debate.
5 Introducing theses into the argument maps does not require one to modify the definition of a dialectical structure. Formally, theses can simply be understood as arguments containing exactly one premiss and a conclusion identical with that premiss.
Partial positions can be combined. Let P 1 : S 1 → {t, f } and P 2 : S 2 → {t, f } be two partial positions which agree on S 1 ∩ S 2 . The conjunction of these positions,
Obviously, the arguments that make up a dialectical structure impose certain constraints on what a proponent can reasonably assert. Not every complete or partial position can rationally be adopted. Thus, a complete position Q on τ is 3. if every premiss p of some argument a ∈ T is assigned the value "true", then a's conclusion is assigned the value "true", too.
A partial position P : S → {t, f } on τ is (dialectically) coherent if and only if it can be extended to a complete position Q on τ (P = Q| S ) which is coherent.
Returning to the complete positions depicted in figure 1, we may note:
• The left-hand-side complete position in that example is coherent. It complies with the coherence conditions set up above.
• The right-hand-side complete position is, however, not coherent. Yet, that position does not merely defy one coherence constraint. Actually, all three conditions are violated. Thus, the right-hand-side position violates constraint (1) because the tokens of sentence 10 are assigned different truth values; it violates constraint (2) because the contradictory sentences 3/-3 are both considered true; and it violates constraint (3) because the conclusion of argument (4,7;-2) is false despite its premisses being true.
Moreover, the partial position shown in figure 2 is not coherent, either, since it cannot be extended to a complete, coherent position. To see this, consider, first of all, the argument (8,-3;2). Since premiss (8) is true and the conclusion (2) is false, the remaining premiss (-3) has to be false. Otherwise the complete position would violate the third constraint. Secondly, in regard of argument (8,3;12) , sentence (3) must be false for analogous reasons. Yet (3) and (-3) cannot be false in the same time because of the second constraint. Hence, the partial position cannot be extended to a coherent complete position.
Based on these primitive notions, we can now introduce the concepts of dialectic entailment and degree of partial entailment, which will play a major role in our attempt to rephrase hypothetico-deductivism. Thus, a partial position P 2 dialectically entails a partial position P 1 , iff all coherent and complete positions which extend P 2 equally extend P 1 . The concept of dialectic entailment may be generalised by following Wittgenstein's basic idea in the Tractatus (and identifying cases with complete and coherent positions on τ ): The degree of partial entailment of a partial position P 1 by a dialectically coherent partial position P 2 , can be defined as,
number of cases with P 1 and P 2 number of cases with P 2 = number of complete & coherent positions that extend P 1 and P 2 number of complete & coherent positions that extend P 2 .
(1)
As a consequence, Doj(P 1 |P 2 ) = 1 if and only if P 2 dialectically entails P 1 . Degrees of partial entailment satisfy, under certain conditions which we shall assume to hold 6 , the axioms of probability theory. 7
Finally, the degree of justification of a partial position P can be defined as its degree of partial entailment from the empty set, 
It can be shown that degrees of justification possess the following properties [cf.
Betz, 2011]:
• Introducing an independent 8 argument that supports (attacks) some thesis t increases (decreases) t's degree of justification.
• Introducing an independent argument that supports (attacks) a supporting argument for some thesis t increases (decreases) t's degree of justification.
• Introducing an independent argument that supports (attacks) some argument which attacks thesis t decreases (increases) t's degree of justification.
• Incorporating premisses of independent arguments that support (attack) some thesis t into the background knowledge increases (decreases) t's degree of justification.
As the degree justification is an indicator of a partial position's robustness, and as it is reasonable to maximise the robustness of one's position, a high degree of justification points to the belief-worthiness of a position [cf. Betz, 2011] . 9
Degrees of justification, as defined above, are sensitive to changes in the dialectical structure which represents the reconstruction of a debate, e.g. a scientific controversy. Far from being a disadvantage, it is precisely this dependency which allows one to understand why the belief-worthiness, and the overall confirmation, of a hypothesis might change in the course of an ongoing argumentation.
8 i.e. an argument whose premisses are neither equivalent nor contradictory to any sentences already contained in the debate.
9 A formal investigation of the concept of degree of justification in Betz [forthcoming] , based on multi-agent simulations of debate dynamics, suggests that degrees of justification may also serve as an indicator of truthlikeness. These results, if actually correct, could substantially strengthen this paper's dialectic defence of the H-D account.
A dialectic account of confirmation
The degree of justification of some hypothesis H relative to a dialectical structure and a given body of background knowledge largely determines H's overall beliefworthiness. If Doj(H) equals 1, H is true. 10 If Doj(H) = 0, H is false. In addition, the higher Doj(H), the more arguments count in favour of H, and the less objections H faces. The overall belief-worthiness of H given some evidence E is nothing but the conditional degree of justification Doj(H|E), i.e. H's degree of justification provided E is incorporated into the background knowledge. It is straightforward to assess the confirmatory impact of E on H by comparing Doj(H) and Doj(H|E). If, for instance, establishing E as true increases H's degree of justification, E inductively supports H. Thus,
The ratio Doj(H|E)/Doj(H) can be defined as the degree of confirmation of H by E. 11 It corresponds to the probabilistic ratio measure of confirmation and gauges the relative increase of H's degree of justification which results from incorporating E into the body of background knowledge. 12 The overall degree of justification of H once the evidence E is verified, i.e. the belief-worthiness of H given E and the state of the debate, trivially satisfies,
and thus depends on (i) the degree of confirmation of H by E, and (ii) the prior degree of justification of H irrespective of E. These are the two directions from where support in favour of some hypothesis might generally stem. Evidential support, on the one side, as well as theoretical support "from above" [cf. Hempel, 1966, pp. 38-40] , on the other side, both increase a hypothesis' overall degree of justification.
Consequently, the degree of confirmation of H by some evidence is not the only indicator for whether H is highly justified and belief-worthy. 13
Note that degrees of justification as well as degrees of confirmation can be calculated, given some dialectical structure, for arbitrary pairs of hypotheses and items of evidence. As a consequence, the dialectic account allows one
• to distinguish the confirmatory relevance of different pieces of evidence for a given hypothesis, as well as
• to determine the specific evidential support some empirical data bestows on different hypotheses, e.g. different parts of a complex theory.
This account thus settles a major short-coming of the simple H-D model of confirmation which Glymour [1980, pp. 30ff .] rightly identifies.
In terms of mathematical structure, the dialectic account set forth so far closely resembles Bayesian Confirmation Theory. So, in which sense does it represent a revamp of the H-D account at all? Besides being based on a fully deductive argumentation framework, the dialectic account generalises the key tenet of the H-D model, namely that a hypothesis is confirmed by its deductive implications. 14 For according to the dialectic model, a hypothesis is confirmed by those statements it 13 Thus, we clearly distinguish (a) the overall degree of belief-worthiness of a hypothesis and (b) the degree of confirmation of that hypothesis by some evidence. Larry Laudan once remarked that "'possessing the same positive instances' and 'being equally well confirmed' boil down to the same thing only in the logician's never-never land. (It was Whewell, Peirce and Popper who taught us all that theories sharing the same positive instances need not be regarded as equally well tested or equally belief-worthy.)" [Laudan, 1990, 282-283] . Whilst we don't consider the theory exposed in this section a Neverland's account of confirmation in the first place, the desideratum Laudan articulates, namely to differentiate empirical consequences on the one hand and overall belief-worthiness on the other hand, is clearly met.
14 It concurs, in this respect, with previous, non-Bayesian attempts to defend the H-D account against the paradoxes (reviewed in improved upon by Sprenger [2011a,b] ), which replaced the classic concept of logical entailment-originally used to articulate hypothetico-deductivism-by a (weaker) notion of relevant implication [e.g. Schurz, 1991 , Gemes, 1993 , 1994 , 2005 . Now, instead of developing a formal notion of relevant entailment, this paper employs the concept of partial dialectic entailment as a substitute for logical entailment.
partially entails (to a certain, sufficient degree). More precisely, the degree of partial entailment of E by H fully determines the degree of confirmation of H by E, as follows directly from Bayes' theorem. 15
Resolving the problems
Raven paradox. We may begin our dialectical analysis of the raven paradox with the obvious observation that the hypothesis H does not entail that there exists a black raven. H does entail-provided the auxiliary assumption that a is a raventhat a is black. Likewise, hypothesis H does not entail that there exists a green leaf. But it does entail-provided the auxiliary assumptions that (i) b is green and that (ii) nothing is green and black in the same time-that b is not a raven. So, as a first thing to note, the situation is not fully symmetrical. To observe that some (given) raven is black confirms H. To observe that some (given) leaf is green does, however, not confirm H . What confirms H , and thus H, is the observation that some (given) non-black entity (e.g. something green) is not a raven (but a leaf).
This apparent asymmetry is also revealed by a more detailed analysis. Setting
Object a is black.
A 1 Object a is a raven.
Object b is not a raven.
A 4 Object b is green.
A 5
Nothing is black and green in the same time.
A 6 Nothing is a leaf and a raven in the same time.
the dialectical structure in figure 3 depicts the inferential relations that hold between the various pieces of evidence and the hypothesis H. Specifically, H entails the items 15 Bayes' theorem, in its simplest variant, reads,
We thus have, figure 3 . The hypothesis H is entailed by E 1 to a higher degree than by E 2 . Likewise, the degree of confirmation of H by E 1 is significantly higher than by E 2 . Still, E 2 does positively confirm H, albeit to a very small degree. Thus, the raven paradox is solved: Observing that some raven is black confirms the raven hypothesis H to a higher degree than observing that some green object is a leafnotwithstanding that the latter lends some minimal support to H, too. 17
Doj(H|E
Grue paradox. A resolution of the grue paradox, understood as an objection to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, should begin by stressing that theory-confirmation, as well as theory-choice, is always carried out (a) against some body of (theoretical) background knowledge and (b) with regard to a finite, contingently composed set of alternatives. The purpose of a philosophical theory of confirmation, we take it, is not to explain and justify how empirical data-and empirical data alone-may support theoretical hypotheses. On the contrary, such a theory must clarify how empirical data, given some background knowledge, may lent support to one hypothesis, compared to a set of rivals.
This said, the grue paradox can be resolved by explicitly including the theoretical arguments for (or against) the rival hypotheses, i.e. the support 'from above', into the analysis. In contrast to a similar strategy discussed by Goodman [1983, p. 77] himself-namely to determine the lawlikeness of a general statement in terms of its overall theoretical support so as to set apart the lawlike statement that all emeralds are green (H 1 ) from the merely accidental claim that they are grue (H 2 )-we suggest to take the theoretical support directly into account in the dialectical analysis, without touching the concept of lawlikeness. Let us consider, to spell out this idea, Goodman's example in some more detail. The relevant background knowledge which determines the overall belief-worthiness of H 1 and H 2 comprises, for instance, the claim that the optic properties of materials supervene on their molecular or atomic structure. The colour of a stone therefore simply doesn't depend on when we observe it. In a dialectical analysis, this general background knowledge translates into a theoretical argument in favour of H 1 (or, alternatively, an argument against H 2 ). Apart from the theoretical support for H 1 , the rival hypotheses entail, by con- Tacking paradox. Consider a situation as described in the tacking paradox above.
We shall assume that claim C, conjoined to the original hypothesis H, is neither 18 Along this general line of reasoning, we may equally solve the additional illustrative riddle Goodman mentions to exemplify his paradox [Goodman, 1983, p. 73] . So, why does observing that a given piece of copper conducts electricity (E1) confirm the hypothesis that copper is conductive (H1), whereas observing that a man in this room is a third son (E2) does not confirm, or so it seems, the hypothesis that all men in this room are third sons (H2)? The answer is that, contrary to one's first impression, both pieces of evidence do lend support to the respective hypothesis. In spite of this fact, however, H1 is, all things considered, more belief-worthy than H2 because of additional theoretical support for H1 (all metals are conductors) as well as theoretical objections to H2 (less than x% of all parents have 3 sons) and, possibly, direct evidential disconfirmation of H2 (this man over there pretends to have no siblings). empirically empty nor empirically equivalent with H, i.e. C has observational implications, say D, which are not implied by H. Consequently, the conjoined hypothesis H&C implies observational statements D as well as E whereas H implies E only.
Figure 5 represents these inferential relations by a dialectical structure, presuming that the derivation of E and D relies on some auxiliary assumptions. As can be seen from the corresponding table, E increases, as a matter of fact, the prior degree of justification of the simple hypothesis H (that is: confirms H) to the same degree as the conjoined hypothesis H&C. Yet, the individual hypotheses C receives much less empirical confirmation from E than H or H&C. Moreover, the simpler hypothesis displays, because of ample prior justification, the greatest conditional degree of justification given E and is, in particular, far better justified than the conjoined hypothesis. 19
Paradox from conceptual difference. In order to solve the paradox from conceptual difference, we will show that, according to the dialectic account, H 1 is confirmed by the piece of evidence e although H 1 doesn't imply e. 
Doj(H
0.5 1.33 0.38 Figure 7 : Argument map depicting the dialectical structure of the problem of novelty. Note that the dialectical structure consists of two independent sub-structures, and that the hypotheses H 1 and H 2 don't represent rivals. The table gives the corresponding degrees of partial entailment and degrees of confirmation.
a reconstruction of the dialectical situation pictured in the problem set-up. Since H 1 and H 2 possess the same empirical implications, E, and since we're not going to investigate how any hypothesis is confirmed by that very evidence, we may disregard E for the sake of simplicity in our analysis. Again, "B" refers to background assumptions which are taken for granted. Note that because H 1 and H 2 are "conceptually distinct", the general theory T implies H 1 without entailing H 2 . As the respective table details, the individual item of evidence e imparts indeed some positive backing to the hypothesis H 1 , increasing its prior degree of justification by 5%.
Problem of novelty. We shall demonstrate that refined hypothetico-deductivism can take novelty into account when assessing the confirmatory impact of some evidence. In order to do so, we consider two independent situations. In our first case, some hypothesis H 1 implies a true, albeit expected item of evidence E 1 . In the second case, however, hypothesis H 2 entails the novel datum E 2 , which-surprisingly, and unexpectedly-turns out to be true. Generally spoken, the fact that some evidence E is expected, or even well-known, corresponds, in terms of the dialectical analysis, to the fact that E is supported by arguments which largely rely on given background assumptions. A piece of evidence E is, on the contrary, unexpected and surprising, if there are arguments against E being the case. In line with this general reasoning, we take it that E 1 is supported by two arguments, while E 2 faces two objections which render it prima facie unexpected. Figure 7 shows the dialectical structure that maps these two cases. Note, as a caveat, that H 1 and H 2 must not be thought of as rival hypotheses. Rather, we have depicted two independent situations which can be compared in order to gauge the effect of novelty on confirmation. As set out in the respective table, the unexpected and surprising evidence E 2 increases H 2 's degree of justification by 34% against merely 6% for H 1 and the previously expected empirical datum E 1 . Thus, novelty boosts confirmatory strength. Note that the superior impact of the novel evidence results from the lower prior degree of justification of H 2 . Once the evidence is verified, both hypothesis actually possess, all things considered, the same degree of justification.
These quantitative results can be given a qualitative explanation within the theory of dialectical structures. As a preliminary step, we observe that different arguments may encode the very same inferential relations. Consider for instance (P 1 ,P 2 ;P 3 ), (¬P 3 ,P 2 ;¬P 1 ), and (P 1 ,¬P 3 ;¬P 2 )-all three arguments basically say that P 1 , P 2 and ¬P 3 cannot be true in the same time. Because such an inferential relation can be represented by different arguments, different dialectical structures, too, may encode the very same inferential relations. Specifically, replacing one argument in τ by a contrapositive variant yields an equivalent dialectical structure τ such that a position is dialectically coherent in τ iff it is coherent in τ . Given these general, preparatory remarks, it is plain that the dialectical structure depicted in figure 8 is equivalent to the one shown in figure 7. In the transformed dialectical structure (figure 8), each hypothesis is directly attacked by an argument. But while the argument against H 1 is, in turn, attacked by two counter-arguments, thus weakening the direct objection, the argument attacking H 2 is backed, and thereby strengthened, by two additional arguments. The two direct objections against H 1 and H 2 rely on the assumption that the corresponding evidence (E 1 and E 2 , respectively) is false. Thus, verifying these items of evidence eclipses the objections: Establishing E 1 blocks the comparatively weak objection to H 1 , establishing E 2 shuts off the relatively strong argument against H 2 . Comprehensibly, validating E 2 has therefore a higher confirmatory impact than validating E 1 . Moreover, once both direct counter-arguments are eclipsed, the two hypotheses, facing no further objections, are, in terms of degree of justification, on a par.
Conclusion
This paper argued that modifying the H-D account of confirmation in the light of recent advances in argumentation theory allows one to resolve the paradoxes which beset hypothetico-deductivism. We may identify, more specifically, two points which have proven crucial in alleviating the problems: This is, firstly, the introduction of the concept of degree of partial entailment which, in turn, enabled us to set forth a quantitative notion of degree of confirmation; and, secondly, the neat conceptual distinction between (i) the evidential support some observation bestows on a hypothesis and (ii) the overall belief-worthiness (all things considered) of a hypothesis.
The credibility of the formal analysis put forward in this paper could be greatly enhanced by concrete case-studies which consist in reconstructions of scientific debates and which show the abstract confirmatory mechanism at work. That research could, e.g., address the interplay between inductive and deductive argumentation in real scientific controversies. 
